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DEMOCRACY-BASED RESISTANCE TO A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SOCIAL
CITIZENSHIP: A COMMENT ON FORBATH
Frank L Michehnan*
A constitutional right or guarantee is "positive," let us say, when it
imposes on government some obligation to bestir itself, to act, in a
manner conducive to the fulfillment of certain interests of persons.
Contentious as it is to suggest that American constitutional law
contains any positive guarantees,' the suggestion appears to be one
that does not die easily. In the view of Professor Forbath, it is kept
alive and kicking today by recollection of a nineteenth century
American democratic-republican ideal of a society committed to run
itself in ways designed to constitute and sustain every person as a
competent, respected, independent contributor to political and
economic life.2
No doubt, a line of argument proceeding from that recollected ideal
points toward formulation of any corresponding, positive
constitutional right in terms of a social-citizenship conception in which
work occupies a central place-that is, as opposed to rights of
guaranteed access to provision of basic material necessities regardless
of work. As Forbath further observes, I have been entirely receptive
to both the democratic-republican ideal and its recollection.' And yet
my publications of the 1960s and '70s spoke always in terms of
putative constitutional rights to guaranteed provision for basic
material needs.'
Forbath offers explanation for this gap between argumentation and
proposition. He suggests it may have stemmed from concerns about
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
1. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
2. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A Brief History,
Critique and Reconstruction, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1821 (2001); see also William E.
Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1999) [hereinafter
Forbath, Caste].
3. See, eg., Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional
Idea of Property, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319 (1987).
4. See, eg., Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One
View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962 (1973); Frank I. Michelman,
The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969).
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legal form, reflecting the court-centeredness of American academic
constitutional thought over the period during which my pertinent
writings were produced. If you think that constitutional rights are for
courts and only courts to apply or put into action, then maybe you will
trim your ideas about how to formulate any putative, positive
constitutional right to your ideas-or what you see as prevailing
ideas-about limits on the judiciary's competence and its proper role
in American government. So if welfare rights seem less threatening to
prevailing ideas about judicial role and competence than would a right
of social citizenship-and they do to me, in a way I'll soon specify-
that could help explain why I thought and wrote of positive
constitutional rights in those days as welfare rights, not social-
citizenship rights.
But of course that explanation fails, or falls away, as applied to
anyone whose thought has shucked court-fixation in favor of the views
that the constitution enforced by judges is not all the constitution
there is, and that contention outside the courts over constitutional
meanings very possibly can be a politically cogent, practically
worthwhile activity. And am I not one of the shuckers, one of the
redeemed?5 And is it not time, then, for me to embrace a social-
citizenship conception of a positive constitutional guarantee, in place
of a welfare-right conception?
I can't help reading Forbath as putting to me that very question. I
take an intended lesson to be something like this: Any progressive-
minded person who (a) takes seriously the constitution outside the
courts, and (b) takes seriously, as a true or a persuasive source of
constitutional meaning, the actual history of expressly constitutional
contention among the citizenry of this country-anyone who thinks
that Sager,6 Tushnet,7 and Ackerman8 are each on to important
aspects of the truth about American constitutional purposes and
American constitutional argument-ought to feel a strong attraction
to a social-citizenship conception, as opposed to a welfare-rights
conception, of positive constitutional rights in the economic sphere.
At least, there should be no resistance to a social-citizenship
conception stemming from any consideration of legal form. To that
proposition, I feel no aversion at all. What I want to do here is
explain what I think might stand in the way of easy, widespread
acceptance of it.
5. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional
Law, in The Cambridge Companion to John Rawls (Samuel Freeman ed.,
forthcoming 2001).
6. See, e.g., Lawrence Sager, The Domain of Constitutional Justice, in
Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations 235 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998);
Lawrence Sager, Justice In Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional
Law, 88 Nw. L. Rev. 410 (1993).
7. See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999).
8. See 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (1998).
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Exactly how is it that we think a court-centered view of
constitutionalism may instigate concerns about constitutional-legal
form? Two answers come immediately to mind. First is the sense we
may have that any alleged constitutional right should be cast in terms
that are justiciable, meaning that the terms leave interpreters with
little room for serious dispute about how to apply them, in most cases
to which the terms will have any conceivable application. Second is
the sense that any alleged constitutional right should be cast in terms
that are narrow, meaning they don't sweepingly preempt major public
policy choices from the ordinary politics of democratic debate and
decision. I insist that we really do have there two answers, not one.
As possible aims for the formulation of a constitutional right,
justiciability and narrowness are quite distinct in both motivation and
application.
The difference in application is easiest to see. Consider Richard
Epstein's dream constitution: no regulatory statute is constitutional,
only the common law is.9 That constitution is both unsurpassably
justiciable (is that a statute I see before me? then strike it down), and
maximally non-narrow. Consider, on the other hand, the South
African constitution's mandate to the government to take reasonable
measures, within available resources, to achieve progressive
realization of a declared right of every South African to have access to
adequate housing." That clause looks narrow enough-it is not on its
face more preemptive of democracy than the modem First
Amendment is" -but it cannot be called justiciable in the sense I have
specified.12
9. See, e-g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of
PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 21, 22-28 (1997).
10. S. Afr. Const. (1996) § 26:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
11. For notable cases applying the First Amendment to block lawmakers from
regulating, respectively, the expressive burning of American flags, the practice of
turning over political signature-gathering to paid firms, commercial advertising, the
amounts of money spent in political campaigns, and culpably negligent defamation of
public officials (soon to become "public figures,") see, e.g., United States v. Eichman,
496 U.S. 310 (1990); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1
(1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
12. Whether that makes it unfit for inclusion in a constitutional bill of rights
expressly committed to judicial enforcement is another question, answered "no" by
both the drafters of South Africa's Constitution and that country's Constitutional
Court. See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1)
SALR 46 (CC), http://www.concourt.gov.zajudgments/2000/grootbooml.pdf (finding
a failure on the state's part to take "reasonable" measures to aid victims of housing
"crisis" and ordering rectification); In re Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SALR 744 (CC) 76, http.//iwww.concourt.gov.za/
judgmentsl1996/const.pdf (concluding that section 26 conforms to the constitutional
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Now let us have a look at the differing motivations for the pulls
toward narrowness and toward justiciability in the formulation of
constitutional rights. The pull toward narrowness reflects a concern
about the constitution preempting from ordinary democratic politics
too large a share of the political choices a country may expect to face
from time to time. The pull toward justiciability reflects something
different, a theory or a view about what kinds of decisions a
politicized legislature and an independent judiciary are comparatively
likely to make well, and what kinds will leave them respectively
subject to appropriate forms of accountability in a democracy' 3
(Roughly, the idea is that an independent judiciary is better at
decisions calling for application of value- and policy-judgments
already recorded in what may be a very complex body of law, and can
effectively be held accountable for such decisions by professional
criticism; whereas decisions calling for fresh judgments of policy or
value, belong, in a democracy, to electorally accountable lawmakers.)
If we now compare a social-citizenship conception with a welfare-
right conception of a positive constitutional guarantee in the economic
sphere, we can see that neither sort of conception trumps the other on
the scale of justiciability. On the scale of narrowness, however, I must
say I think the social-citizenship conception may suffer some in the
comparison. As for justiciability, recall the South African
constitutional mandate to the government to take reasonable
measures, within available resources, to achieve progressive
realization of the right of all South Africans to have access to
adequate housing-a welfare right, not a social-citizenship right. On
the one hand, it would have been rash indeed-not to say foolish and
vain-for the drafters to have cast the housing right in terms any more
absolute or less qualified than the ones they chose. On the other
hand, the terms they chose-the state has a duty to make the best
progress it reasonably can from time to time-do not register
especially high on the scale of justiciability, and certainly no higher
than would a declared duty of the state to do the best it can to
maintain an economy and society in which everyone who wants it has
access to respectable, fulfilling, adequately remunerated work.
On the scale of narrowness, though, there does seem to be a real
difference between the two formulations, with the advantage going to
the welfare right. To see this, one need only heed Professor Forbath's
summary of what a constitutional right of social-citizenship was
thought to cover by its Populist sponsors in the Gilded Age:
freeing ... labor ... from the "iron rule of the Money power"
through public credit and support for cooperative enterprise;...
principle of separation of powers).
13. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1175 (1989).
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nationalizing the railways;... ensuring for industrial workers the
"right to a remunerative job" through public works and
countercyclical spending and, through an end to the repressive
common law restraints on workers' collective action and the
savagery of "government by injunction," encouraging robust unions
and industrial cooperation; and through these agencies... enabling
workers to exercise the rights and responsibilities of control over
productive property.14
To which we in our own times may add: publicly guaranteed
education and training for all, of adequate quality; infant, child, and
elderly care; workplace health and safety, fair employment, wage and
hour laws; global trade issues or what we may call the NAFTA
question; macroeconomic policy and controls; public oversight of
industrial organization, including antitrust and other legal counters to
restraints of trade; anti-plutocratic political institutions and practices
including campaign regulation; and I'm sure I've left a lot out.
In sum, it looks as though a constitutional social-citizenship right
has tentacles reaching in a hundred directions, into the deepest
redoubts of the common law and the most basic choices of political
economy a modem society can make. Abortion aside-if it is aside,
which it very arguably is not -what leading issues on the current
American political calendar would be untouched?
So here is the question: Might this apparent, formal characteristic
of a positive constitutional right of social citizenship-its obvious and
decided lack of narrowness-call forth resistance to such a conception
out of the pro-democratic strain in American constitutional thought?
It seems to me it very likely would. I don't say the idea should incite
pro-democratic resistance, I say it would. (On normative grounds, I
would argue that it should not, but I don't know how widely American
constitutional thought may share my understanding of democracy as a
substantive, no less than a procedural, ideal. 5)
One might ask: how could the idea of a positive constitutional right
of social citizenship stir democracy-based resistance, as long as we are
talking about the constitution outside the courts? I have two answers
to suggest. The first is that we here today are not at liberty to
fantasize about a constitution completely outside the courts. However
receptive mainstream American constitutional thought may be to the
idea of a constitution extending beyond the courts, it is not, today,
about to imagine the constitution taken away from the courts. The
point is that mainstream thought, therefore, cannot help but see, in
every proclamation of a constitutional right, an opening and a
14. Forbath, Caste, supra note 2, at 49.
15. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Hunan Rights and the Limits of Constitutional
Theory, 13 Ratio Juris 63, 75 (2000); Frank I. Michelman, "Protecting tile People from
Themselves," or How Direct Can Democracy Be?, 45 U.C.L.A. L Rev. 1717, 1732-34
(1998).
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temptation to the judiciary to add some further sphere or spheres of
public decision-making to the ones in which it already feels licensed to
take a sometimes heavy hand.
A second answer is more refined. As we've seen, a constitutional
duty to cater for the social citizenship of every person casts a very
wide-ranging constraint over public decision-making. I now want to
add that it does so, regardless of what degree of judicial enforcement
may be expected. At least, that is so if we take the supposed right
seriously and we suppose our legislators conscientious. (And what
could it possibly boot our cause to debase the constitutional
currency-and I mean rhetorical currency-by naming something a
constitutional right that we don't expect to be seriously taken, by
public officials presumed conscientious?) Assuming we are serious
about the extra-judicial, political efficacy of the naming of something
as a constitutional right, then-many will think-we cannot so name
social citizenship without intending a heavy drag on democracy, even
if we mean also (vainly) to be moving for the constitution to be taken
entirely away from the courts.
Speaking for myself, I think a critique along those lines of Forbath's
proposal would proceed from a terribly wrong understanding of
democracy. On what I regard as the better view of what democracy is,
the blatant "non-justiciability" of a social-citizenship right-its utter
lack of mechanical applicability to any hard or contested question of
public policy-is exactly what saves it from charges of contrariety to
democracy. (Remember, I am assuming, now, that the courts are out
of the picture). Recognition of a constitutional social-citizenship right
would not crisply answer any major question of public policy. The
most it could do (still assuming away the courts)-and what a gain for
democracy if it really could do this much!-is impose a certain
constraint on how citizens and their elected representatives would
frame and approach sundry questions of public policy. In Rawlsian
language, the chief significance of recognition of social citizenship as a
constitutional right would be the special inflection, the special content,
it would give to American public reason.16 Across a very broad
swathe of public issues, such a recognition would demand that those
issues be approached as occasions for exercises of socially responsible
judgment-which choice will best conduce to the social citizenship of
everyone? -rather than as invitations to press and to vote one's own
interests and preferences.
Of course, to call them matters of judgment is to see that these are
matters on which opinions can and will differ markedly, reasonably,
and sincerely. But surely no harm to democracy lies there.
Disagreements over constitutional-interpretive judgment make as
16. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in Collected Papers 573
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); Michelman, supra note 5.
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good a seedbed for democracy, or better, than do conflicts of interest
or preference. Democracy, then, will name the practice by which we
test, exchange, revise, pool, and count the constitutional-interpretive
judgments of everyone in order to obtain, from time to time, the
"institutional settlements" we need. 7 Now that is a pretty idealistic
view. Nor can I doubt it is a minority view, by comparison with the
view that democracy means, quite strictly, that the people are free to
treat their political agenda as a series of contests of normatively
unregulated preferences, as opposed to a series of occasions for
constitutional judgment or constitutional interpretation. Given that
cultural fact, we may expect a proposed constitutional positive right of
social citizenship to provoke a democracy-based objection of legal
form, namely, extreme non-narrowness.
In the wake of the naming of this right, it would seem, there would
loom three possible future courses of events: Either (1) the judiciary
would take up the constitutional cause of the positive right of social
citizenship and dictate in its name an insufferable amount of public
policy; or (2) the newly named right would be stillborn, a dead letter,
a joke, honored in the breach, a constant reproach and threat to
constitutional-democratic legitimacy in this country; or (3a) the
natural, rightful energy of popular preference and self-serving partisan
struggle in public policymaking would be curbed and deadened by an
almost unimaginable pall of self-restraint; or (3b) the natural energy
of popular, judgment-bound, publicly reasonable, deliberative
political contestation would at long last emerge into life and being.
Of course, 3a and 3b are not alternative possible courses of events.
They are alternative descriptions of the same imagined course of
events from the standpoints of two contrasting views of the nature of
constitutional-democratic energy at its possible best. I wish 3b
expressed American political culture's prevailing view of that possible
best. But I don't believe it does, and neither, Reader, do you.
17. See Frank I. Michelman, Why Voting?, 34 Loy. LA. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2001). On "the principle of institutional settlement," see Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert
M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law
1-10 (1994).
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